REFUGEE/MIGRANT CRISIS IN EUROPE: SCENARIOS
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA, ITALY, SPAIN AND OTHER TRANSIT COUNTRIES OVER THE NEXT 6 MONTHS
6 APRIL 2017
SUMMARY

Scenario 1 Slight increase in migration via N Africa to EU

The political and security situation in Libya remains unstable and the movement of migrants from Libya to the Mediterranean continues largely unhindered. The slightly rising trend in arrivals to Italy continues, with an expected seasonal spike during the summer months as smuggler activity becomes slightly more organised. The number of people stuck in Libya remains stable. Meanwhile the number of returns and readmissions from (and to) EU member states continues at a very low level.

Protection (especially for women, children and those in detention in Libya) is the overwhelming priority need as human rights abuses, including detention, trafficking and SGBV continue. Those stuck in Libya also need food, shelter and WASH services while advocacy to the Italian authorities to increase the processing of asylum claims and provide more effective community integration for migrants is also a priority.

Scenario 2 Large increase in migration and readmissions

Continued insecurity and ineffective law enforcement in Libya coupled with improved and expanded smuggling operations result in a significant increase in the number of migrants attempting to cross from north Africa to Europe. New routes through Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Morocco, open up. The numbers of deaths at sea increase. Meanwhile European countries place further restrictions on the movement of migrants, attempt to increase returns and Dublin transfers, and increase the use of detention for those awaiting return or transfer.

Priority needs are as for scenario 1, and protection for those who fear forced return/Dublin transfer and Increased search & rescue operations.

Scenario 3 Enforced closure of central Mediterranean route

To prevent a re-escalation of the migrant crisis, the EU adopts tougher measures to disrupt the smuggling operations in Libya and prevent migrants crossing to Italy via the central Mediterranean route. The number of arrivals in Italy reduces dramatically until swift adaptation of the smuggling business results in a gradual increase in arrivals via new routes through Egypt and possibly Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Increased numbers of people are stuck in Libya where humanitarian assistance and protection continue to be largely absent: conditions deteriorate while increasing numbers of migrants risk new, more costly and dangerous routes to Italy and Spain.

Throughout north Africa, protection and the provision of health and psychosocial services for those risking the new and longer routes to Europe is a priority. In Libya, protection (as for scenario 2 and for children against recruitment to armed groups) remains a priority along with the provision of all basic humanitarian services, including education and livelihoods.

Scenario 4 Improved internal security in Libya

The migrant crisis continues to dominate the EU political agenda resulting in increased efforts to stabilise Libya. Significant EU investment in Libya leads to a noticeable improvement in security and governance in Libya. Humanitarian access improves while improved internal security and border controls restrict smuggling operations from Libya via the central Mediterranean route. Legal pathways open up for asylum-seekers in North Africa. The number of migrants stuck in Libya continues to rise and, although conditions begin to improve and more migrants decide to remain in Libya, smuggling activity continues for the few determined to reach Europe. National humanitarian responders are overwhelmed.

Protection issues in Libya remain a priority and there is a need to scale up health, psychosocial services, food assistance, shelter, and WASH assistance. Meanwhile search and rescue operations need to adjust to the new routes.
Migration via the Central and West Mediterranean

Data Sources: Natural Earth, OSM, IOM, Eurostat, UNHCR
Map created by MapAction (2017)
INTRODUCTION

PROBLEM STATEMENT
While 2016 saw a dramatic reduction in the number of migrants entering the EU via the eastern route from Turkey to Greece; entry via the central route, from Libya to Italy, continued to increase. These scenarios consider how future policy decisions and the security situation in Libya, combined with other relevant variables, could affect movement in the region, specifically through Libya and Egypt, over the coming six months, and the potential humanitarian consequences.

As the EC and member states become increasingly desperate to stem the movement of migrants into the EU, efforts to strengthen borders and readmit or return migrants to countries of origin or transit are increasing, further jeopardising the safety and welfare of the most desperate.

SCENARIOS FOR APRIL–SEPTEMBER 2017
These scenarios are not attempts to predict the future. Rather they are a description of situations that could occur in the coming six months, and are designed to highlight possible impacts and humanitarian consequences. The aim is to support strategic planning, create awareness, and promote preparedness activities for those responding to this crisis. See the Methodology section for more information on how these scenarios were developed.

LIMITATIONS
Scenarios can seem to oversimplify an issue, as the analysis balances details against broader assumptions. But scenario-building is not an end in itself. It is a process for generating new ideas that should in turn lead to actual changes in project design or decision-making.

Due to time constraints, it was not possible to visit or consult individuals in all affected countries.

These scenarios focus primarily on the movement through Libya and via the central and west Mediterranean routes. It should be noted that the relative impact of each scenario on other countries would differ significantly. Scenarios for the eastern route from the Middle East to the EU via Turkey and Greece can be found at www.acaps.org/themes/scenario-building.

HOW TO USE THIS DOCUMENT
Four scenarios are summarised on page 2. Pages 6 to 9 provide more detail on the scenarios, including potential humanitarian consequences. Page 10 lists six factors that could compound the humanitarian consequences of any of the scenarios: increased readmissions and returns (within and from the EU); reduced search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea; a heatwave in southern Europe; decreased humanitarian funding; a natural disaster in Italy; and increased security incidents in the EU. Annex A at page 12 is a summary of the trigger events that, should they occur, could lead towards the situations described in the scenarios.

TERMINOLOGY
Throughout the report the term ‘refugees and other migrants’ is used to include all persons in mixed migration flows (this may include asylum seekers, trafficked persons, refugees, migrants, and other people on the move). Any reference to specific groups is consistent with the original source.

‘Readmissions’ are based on reciprocal agreements between countries. An agreement may be between an EU member state and a non-EU country, or it may be between two EU member states in the case of the Dublin Agreement, in which case it is referred to as a ‘transfer’ (see ‘Dublin Transfer’ below).

‘Return’ is the process by which EU member states move an irregularly staying third country national to country of origin or a country through which they have transited.

‘Dublin Transfer’ is the process by which EU member states move asylum seekers to another EU member state that is responsible for the investigation of the case under the Dublin regulation.

‘Relocation’ is the process by which a person in need of international protection is moved from Greece or Italy based on European Council decision of September 2015 to alleviate the pressure on Greece and Italy.
Migration to Europe via the central and western Mediterranean

Following the EU – Turkey deal in March 2016, and the consequent decline in the number of people migrating along the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece, the Central Mediterranean route to Italy became the most popular migration channel to Europe. In 2016 181,000 people arrived in Italy, representing an 18% increase from the year before: 113,000 of them arrived between April and September. Just over half of all arrivals requested asylum in Italy in 2016. Meanwhile more than 13,000 people arrived in Spain, a 70% increase on 2015. (EC 21/01/2017; Global Migration Data Portal 03/2016, UNHCR 17/02/2016; UNHCR 12/2016, IOM 03/2017, IOM 12/2016).

As of mid-March 2017, over 23,000 people have arrived in Italy, comprising 81% of all arrivals to Europe so far this year. This compares to 10,200 in the first three months of 2015, and 18,800 during the same time last year. Significantly more deaths have also been recorded throughout the first three months of 2017: 813 compared to 159 in 2016. The main countries of origin for all arrivals in to Italy are Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire and Eritrea. Arrival trends in Italy show that despite the vast reduction in people using the Eastern route, nationalities that had been arriving in Greece have not opted to take the Central route in significant numbers (EC 21/01/2017; UNHCR 21/02/2017; 23/03/2016 & 30/03/2016).

Of note is the rise in the number of unaccompanied or separated children (UASC): from 2015 to 2016 there was an increase of 14% (25,000). This is a trend that has continued in to 2017. (UNHCR 31/01/2017; EC 25/02/2017)

Around 1,500 people have arrived in Spain since the start 2017, representing 6% of all arrivals to Europe, and a 40% increase on the same period in 2016. (UNHCR 23/03/2016)

North African transit countries

Libya has no state policy in place for asylum claim and Libyan law criminalises irregular migration, and allows for indefinite detention of foreign nationals for the purpose of deportation. There are regular reports of torture and sexual abuse of those in custody. People are forced to stay in dire living conditions. (Amnesty International 14/06/2016)

Between January and March 2017 90% of all departures for Italy were from Libya and 7% were from Egypt: while this represents a small proportion, the number of departures from Egypt is an increase of 25% compared to 2016.

The movement of migrants to Spain is primarily via Morocco where most are processed in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta. Two breaches of the border in February saw 850 migrants cross to the enclave where more than 1,400 migrants were awaiting processing.

Current EU policy

In January 2017 a bilateral deal was agreed between Italy and Libya with the aim to strengthen cooperation in stemming the flow of irregular migration. The EU is supporting Italy by investing in building the capacity of Libyan coast guards to improve border security and anti-smuggling measures. There are also plans in place to construct safe centres for migrants inside Libya. The extent of the level of cooperation between the two countries remains unclear. (IRIN 13/01/2017; Reuters 17/03/2017)

There is growing impetus to enforce the Dublin Agreement, which stipulates that migrants are to be sent back to their first country of entry. Thus far, implementation of the agreement has been slow and there is a large discrepancy between the number of requests for readmission and the number of actual transfers: for example in Germany, while over 55,600 requests for readmission were made in 2016, fewer than 4,000 were carried out. (ECRE 03/2017)

Election campaigns in France and Germany are ongoing and an election campaign will also begin in Italy towards the end of the year. Meanwhile Brexit negotiations will gain momentum. In light of these developments inside Europe, the European Union will likely adopt policies to prevent the migration issue becoming another destabilising factor. The right-wing media will continue to influence politicians’ response in dealing with the crisis. Negotiations between Libya and the EU will continue. Libya has requested EUR 800 million from the EU to respond to the migration crisis. To date the EU has allocated EUR 200m to fight smuggling across the central and west Mediterranean routes (of which EUR 90m is earmarked for Libya) while Italy has established a separate EUR 200m fund to help African countries stem migration, In terms of the number of migrant arrivals in to Europe. A seasonal increase in the number of migrant arrivals is expected over the summer months. (Reuters 20/03/2017)
### Scenario 1: Continued increasing migration via N Africa to EU

**Probability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Unlikely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
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**Impact**

<table>
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<th>Improvement</th>
<th>Status quo</th>
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The political and security situation in Libya remains unstable and the implementation of the Italy – Libya deal has minimal effect on the movement of migrants through Libya. The slightly rising trend in arrivals to Italy continues, with an expected seasonal spike during the summer months as smuggler activity becomes slightly more organised but otherwise migration patterns remain unchanged. The number of people stuck in Libya remains stable. Libya continues to be the preferred route to Europe and the number of people migrating via Egypt or Morocco remains limited. Meanwhile the number of returns and readmissions from (and to) EU member states continues at a very low level.

**Possible triggers/assumptions**

- Numbers of sub-Saharan migrants entering Libya does not increase significantly
- No significant change to smuggling routes or costs
- The EU-Libya deal has no effect on the security or stability of Libya
- Humanitarian space in Libya remains very limited
- Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea continue or expand
- NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures

**Estimated additional caseload**

- 120,000 people arriving in Italy/Spain (Apr-Sep).
- 20,000 people stuck in Libya

**Geographic areas of most concern**

Libya, and to a lesser extent, Italy, and Spain.

**Impact**

Border controls remain inefficient, as the rule of law and the security situation in Libya is unchanged. The movement of people therefore continues unabated, and smuggling activities continue to profit and become slightly more organised. Overcrowded and unseaworthy boats continue to be used to transport people across the Mediterranean.

Deaths at sea continue and others are reported missing. The number of arrivals to Italy, and to a lesser extent to Spain, continues to rise.

**Humanitarian consequences**

In Libya people continue to suffer human rights abuses, including detention. As movement across the Mediterranean continues, children are especially vulnerable to trafficking. The number of UASC arriving in Italy continues to rise. As more people arrive in Italy, reception centres become overcrowded although people do continue to receive a basic level of humanitarian assistance. Slow bureaucratic procedures however, continue to sustain a backlog of asylum claims creating a high level of mental strain among migrants as they are stuck indefinitely. Weak communication between migrants and aid organisations, and slow bureaucracy results in people lacking all the required information upon arrival in Italy.

As EU attention moves away from the migrant issue, and it is no longer considered a crisis, funding models change limiting funding for humanitarian activities.

**Priority needs**

- Protection (especially for women, children and those in detention in Libya) and anti-trafficking measures in Libya and Italy
- Health and psychosocial support both for those stuck in Libya and those reaching Italy, particularly for children.
- Food and WASH are a priority, especially for those in detention.
- Additional legal support and clear communication with beneficiaries through the appropriate communication channels is needed as people continue to arrive in to Italy.
- Family reunification, information, shelter and accommodation, access to livelihoods, education, and social services in Italy and Spain.
- Advocacy to the Italian authorities to increase the processing of asylum claims and to provide more effective community integration for migrants is also a priority.

**Operational constraints**

Humanitarian access to migrants stuck in Libya remains limited.
Scenario 2 Large increase in migration and readmissions

Probability

Impact

Continued insecurity and ineffective law enforcement in Libya coupled with improved and expanded smuggling operations, both from countries of origin to Libya and from Libya across the Mediterranean, result in a significant increase in the number of migrants attempting to cross from North Africa to Europe. The number of people crossing to Italy and awaiting passage in Libya increases, as does the number of people using alternative routes through Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Morocco. The number of deaths at sea also increases. Meanwhile European countries place further restrictions on the movement of migrants, attempt to increase returns and Dublin transfers, and increase the use of detention for those awaiting return or transfer.

Possible triggers/assumptions
Some or all of the following occur:
- Libyan internal insecurity continues or increases
- Political instability in Libya continues or increases
- Libyan security forces make no significant efforts to curb smuggling operations
- The EU-Libya deal has no effect on the security or stability of Libya
- Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan Africa countries increases
- Morocco relaxes its border controls with Cueta, Spain
- Restrictions on migrants in Turkey tighten following the referendum in April
- Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya fall
- Additional smuggling routes open up
- Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea continue or expand
- NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures
- Rapid deterioration in food security in Nigeria and/or Somalia

Estimated additional caseload
250,000 from April to September.

Geographic areas of most concern
Libya, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Sea, and to a lesser extent Italy and Spain.

Impact
Increasing numbers of migrants in transit via an increased number of routes and smuggling businesses results in increased numbers of deaths, people missing at sea, and increased trafficking. Economies of scale enable smugglers to reduce costs; increased turnover in the smuggling business further funds local militias, further undermining state-building activities. The large increase in arrivals in Italy and, smaller yet significant increase in Spain, feed anti-immigrant sentiment and the right-wing press causing EU countries to tighten movement control for migrants, especially in the run up to key elections. This results in a sharp rise in readmissions, increasing pressure on existing capacity and mechanisms for processing asylum claims, readmissions and returns. Pre-screening for admissibility becomes more mechanical and less individualised: status-determination is increasingly based on given criteria such as nationality. The EU determines that additional countries are ‘safe’ for returns, resulting in legal challenges from humanitarian organisations during which member states place increasing numbers of ineligible asylum-seekers in detention pending return. Public opinion becomes increasingly anti-migrant.

Humanitarian consequences
In Libya increasing numbers of people are vulnerable to torture; violence against migrants; indefinite detention; trafficking; and extortion as are those opting to transit via Egypt. Access to food, healthcare, and other basic services is limited for many migrants. Existing humanitarian are services overwhelmed.

While Italy absorbs the additional caseload (with additional funds from the EU) claims for asylum and demand for humanitarian support double; psycho-social care needs and numbers of UASC in need of protection and assistance increase.

In other EU countries, the use of detention for failed asylum-seekers awaiting return to contested safe countries increases, as does hostility from host populations. Readmissions to first country of entry and returns to safe countries also increase. Increased number of migrants ‘disappear’ fearing return/readmission increasing their vulnerability to exploitation and reducing access to basic services.

Priority needs
- As for scenario 1, and:
- Protection for those who fear forced return/Dublin transfer
- Increased search & rescue

Operational constraints
Humanitarian access to migrants stuck in Libya decreases while the limited humanitarian presence in Egypt hinders the provision of timely humanitarian assistance and protection.

Readmission results in additional tensions between Italy, and to a lesser extent Spain, and the EU, complicating the provision of EU support to the national immigration infrastructures.
**Scenario 3 Enforced closure of central Mediterranean route**

To prevent a re-escalation of the migrant crisis, the EU adopts tougher measures to disrupt the smuggling operations in Libya and prevent migrants crossing to Italy via the central Mediterranean route. The number of arrivals in Italy reduces dramatically until swift adaptation of the smuggling business results in a gradual increase in arrivals via new routes through Egypt and possibly Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Increased numbers of people are stuck in Libya where humanitarian assistance and protection continues to be largely absent; conditions deteriorate while increasing numbers of migrants risk new, more costly and dangerous routes to Italy and Spain.

**Possible triggers/assumptions**
Some or all of the following occur:
- EU/Italy-Libya agreement significantly constrains smuggling operations in Libya
- NATO or Libyan military adopt tougher sea-border control measures
- The EU externalises border control to north African countries
- Political will of EU to accept new arrivals decreases
- Public opinion in Europe becomes increasingly anti-migrant
- Multiple security incidents, attributed by media to immigrants, in EU countries

**Estimated additional caseload**
60,000 arrivals in Italy; more than 60,000 additional people in need in N Africa.

**Geographic areas of most concern**
Libya, Egypt and possibly Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

**Impact**
Number of arrivals in Italy and Spain decreases substantially but begins to increase later in the year as smugglers move migrants via other North African countries, involving longer and more dangerous journeys. Increased numbers of migrants become stuck in Libya. The militarising of the Libyan sea border results in more deaths and missing at sea as smugglers and migrants make increasingly unsafe attempts to reach Europe and search and rescue operations reduce due to the reduction in migration.

Increased numbers of migrants are detained in or deported from Libya while increasing numbers of migrants are recruited into armed groups.

Increased migrant movement from Libya through Egypt increases stress on the local security forces and population.

Anti-immigrant sentiment in EU member states reduces as number of new arrivals fall and reports of increased deaths at sea increase. Political will to assist and protect migrants already residing in the EU increases reducing the pressure to increase readmissions and returns.

**Humanitarian consequences**
Increased numbers of people are in need of protection in Libya, especially if famine in Nigeria or Somalia triggers significant additional population movement to Libya. Those in detention, susceptible to recruitment into armed groups, women, UASC, and the elderly are especially vulnerable. Humanitarian access for national Libyan organisations improves slightly although the scale of need overwhelms the response capacity. Human rights violations increase, especially in areas beyond the control of Libyan authorities. Migrants resorting to alternative routes (via Egypt or Algeria) face increased risk of trafficking and sexual abuse. The need for search and rescue would reduce.

**Priority needs**
- Search and rescue operations would need to adjust to the new routes

  In North Africa:
  - protection (especially for women, children, those in detention in Libya and those moving on new routes);
  - health and psychosocial support

  In Libya:
  - shelter, food and WASH as increasing numbers put pressure on diminishing resources
  - provision of livelihoods, education, and social services
  - legal assistance, family reunification, information

**Operational constraints**
Security in Libya continues to restrict international humanitarian access. The lack of humanitarian presence in Egypt hinders the provision of timely humanitarian assistance and protection.
Scenario 4 Improved internal security in Libya

The migrant crisis continues to dominate the EU political agenda resulting in increased efforts to stabilise Libya. Following the successful implementation of the Italy-Libya deal, deals between EU-countries of origin and transit, and additional EU investment in Libya, security and governance improve in Libya. Humanitarian access improves while improved internal security and border controls restrict smuggling operations from Libya via the central Mediterranean route. Legal pathways open up for asylum-seekers in North Africa. The number of migrants stuck in Libya continues to rise and, although conditions begin to improve and more migrants decide to remain in Libya, smuggling activity continues for the few determined to reach Europe.

Possible triggers/assumptions
Some or all of the following occur:
- Libyan EU/Italy-Libya agreements contribute to improved security in Libya
- Internal Libyan political divisions diminish
- EU externalises border control to north African countries;
- Shelter camps established in Libya improving living conditions and safety of migrants
- Political will of EU to accept new arrivals decreases
- Public opinion in Europe becomes increasingly anti-migrant
- Multiple security incidents, attributed to migrants or Islamists, in EU countries
- Number of people moving from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya reduces

Estimated additional caseload
Up to 100,000 in Libya; up to 20,000 in Italy

Geographic areas of most concern
Libya

Impact
The total number of people crossing the Mediterranean decreases as an improved security situation in Libya results in tighter border control. This results in an increased number of people stuck inside Libya, however the operating environment for some humanitarian agencies improves. An improvement in Libya, coupled with a successful externalisation of EU border policy, results in the disruption of smuggling activities precipitating the establishment of alternative, more clandestine routes from Egypt and to a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia. Consequently, some people migrate towards these countries as they become more prominent points of departure for Europe.

Human rights abuses continue in Libya; costs and risks to migrants moving via Egypt increase vulnerability.

Humanitarian consequences
A reduction in smuggling operations from Libya results in fewer deaths at sea over the next six months. There are however new risks for migrants as they pursue alternative avenues via other transit countries that are potentially more dangerous and costly. Humanitarian agencies and search and rescue operations may be underprepared along these previously less travelled routes. Although security improves in Libya overall, the higher number of people stuck will be at risk of human rights violations.

Priority needs
- Protection remains a priority in Libya, especially for women, children, and those in detention despite a general increase in security
- Protection for those moving along newer routes via Egypt.
- Scale up of humanitarian operations in Libya and Egypt to provide protection, shelter, food and WASH.
- Provision of livelihoods, education, and social services in Libya

Operational constraints
Security in Libya restricts number of INGOs prepared to establish operations.

Impact
The total number of people crossing the Mediterranean decreases as an improved security situation in Libya results in tighter border control. This results in an increased number of people stuck inside Libya, however the operating environment for some humanitarian agencies improves. An improvement in Libya, coupled with a successful externalisation of EU border policy, results in the disruption of smuggling activities precipitating the establishment of alternative, more clandestine routes from Egypt and to a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia. Consequently, some people migrate towards these countries as they become more prominent points of departure for Europe.

Human rights abuses continue in Libya; costs and risks to migrants moving via Egypt increase vulnerability.

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A reduction in smuggling operations from Libya results in fewer deaths at sea over the next six months. There are however new risks for migrants as they pursue alternative avenues via other transit countries that are potentially more dangerous and costly. Humanitarian agencies and search and rescue operations may be underprepared along these previously less travelled routes. Although security improves in Libya overall, the higher number of people stuck will be at risk of human rights violations.

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- Protection remains a priority in Libya, especially for women, children, and those in detention despite a general increase in security
- Protection for those moving along newer routes via Egypt.
- Scale up of humanitarian operations in Libya and Egypt to provide protection, shelter, food and WASH.
- Provision of livelihoods, education, and social services in Libya

Operational constraints
Security in Libya restricts number of INGOs prepared to establish operations.
COMPOUNDING FACTORS

The following developments can occur in parallel to any of the above scenarios and have the potential to significantly change the humanitarian situation.

Increased readmissions and returns

Current efforts to make return and readmission policies more effective may gain impetus, especially if the migration issue continues to dominate the media and political agenda. The desire for member state governments to be perceived as better managing migration, especially in the run-up to elections in Germany, France, and Italy, will drive efforts to accelerate readmissions and returns. To do this more countries may be recognised as ‘safe’, including Libya should the political and security situation show any sign of improvement.

Measures supporting return or readmission may be pursued via four avenues: 1) implementation of the Dublin Agreement; 2) return to country of origin via forced or voluntary return; 3) returns based on bilateral agreements; 4) push back to a previous country.

An increasing number of returns to country of origin will have further humanitarian consequences. Reception centres are likely inadequate. In case of large-scale movement needs will be great across all sectors. Protection concerns will be especially severe as people are at risk of human rights abuses and detention and there are problems concerning reintegration. Children will be particularly vulnerable as they have fewer coping mechanisms. An increase in readmissions via the Dublin Agreement or people being pushed back, may lead to secondary movement within Europe as well as an increased number of people going underground.

Reduced search and rescue operations

As efforts to stem the flow of people crossing the Mediterranean gain momentum, there may be increased pressure on humanitarian organisations to limit their dedicated search and rescue operations. Should this occur, the number of deaths at sea and people missing at sea will increase, at least until smugglers adapt their approach and become less reliant on search and rescue operations.

Heat wave in southern Europe

A heat wave in the Mediterranean, and in Italy and Spain, would result in a deterioration of conditions for migrants both during transit and upon arrival. There will be a greater need for immediate and consistent access to drinking water and improved access to sanitation facilities and health care. The likelihood of disease would increase.

Decrease in humanitarian funding

It is possible that funding will become increasingly politicised and linked to specific demands from the EU or member states such as ensuring a reduction in the number of migrants entering Europe. Humanitarian organisations may therefore find acceptable funding avenues reduce.

Natural disaster in Italy

A high impact (i.e. level 3) natural disaster such as an earthquake in Italy would negatively impact the economy and divert government and humanitarian organisation resources both during the emergency relief and reconstruction phases when priorities for disaster management may change. As a result, the provision of services to migrants arriving in Italy may reduce. If a major natural disaster affects an area with a high proportion of migrants, it could incentivise returns to countries of origin or onward movement from Italy.

Security incidents in Europe

One or more security incidents attributed (at least by media) to migrants in Europe would harden anti-immigrant sentiment. Such a shift in public opinion could result in increased restrictions on asylum-seekers such as increased numbers of people in detention centres. The increased anti-immigrant sentiment following an attack would play into the hands of the far-right movement, putting more pressure on EU member states to reduce the number of relocation and resettlement places being made available. Such an incident may also accelerate return policies.
HOW SCENARIOS CAN BE USED

Scenarios are a set of different ways in which a situation may develop. The aim of scenario building is not to try and accurately predict the future but rather to understand the range of possible futures and then select a few that result in distinct situations with, usually, differing humanitarian outcomes that can:

- Support strategic planning for agencies and NGOs.
- Identify assumptions underlying anticipated needs and related interventions.
- Enhance the adaptability and design of detailed assessments.
- Influence monitoring and surveillance systems.
- Create awareness, provide early warning, and promote preparedness activities among stakeholders.

For more information on how to build scenarios, please see the ACAPS Technical Brief on Scenario Development.

METHODODOLOGY

These scenarios were developed in March 2017, during a one-day workshop in Budapest. Staff from 14 organisations including donors, UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross contributed to these scenarios through participation in the workshop or bilateral meetings.

During the workshop the many variables that could cause change in the migrant situation were mapped and the following key factors identified:

- The political and security situation in Libya
- EC and EU member state political developments and political will
- Irregular pathways for migrant movement
- Legal pathways for seeking asylum
- Returns and readmissions.

By making assumptions as to how these variables might plausibly change, four scenarios were identified. These scenarios were then expanded and the major impacts of each scenario and their humanitarian consequences identified.

Three of the scenarios are mutually exclusive; the fourth could unfold simultaneously, be part of, or lead to, another scenario.

A list of individual triggers is given on pages 13 - 15. It should be noted that a combination, but not necessarily all, of the triggers are required to reach a scenario.

This report is compiled by ACAPS based on bi-lateral meetings and a workshop; it does not necessarily represent the individual views or positions of the IFRC or other organisations involved.

THANK YOU

ACAPS would like to thank all organisations that provided input for these scenarios, especially DFID, Frontex, Hellenic Red Cross, ICRC, IFRC, IOM, Italian Red Cross, Serbian Red Cross, UNICEF, and UNHCR who attended the workshop in Budapest as well as those who contributed via bilateral meetings. Thanks are due also to the IFRC who funded this scenario-building exercise and hosted the workshop at their Regional Office in Budapest and the Mixed Migration Platform for co-facilitating and supporting the secondary data analysis.

For additional information or to comment please email analysis@acaps.org.
**SCENARIO TRIGGERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>Scenario 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued increasing migration via N Africa to EU</td>
<td>Large increase in migration and readmissions</td>
<td>Enforced closure of central Mediterranean route</td>
<td>Improved internal security in Libya</td>
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**Background information**

The scale of humanitarian need for people on the move from North Africa to the EU is likely to **increase** significantly if:

- Libyan internal insecurity increases
- Political instability in Libya increases
- Libyan security forces make no significant efforts to curb smuggling operations
- The EU-Libya deal has no effect on the security or stability of Libya
- Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan African countries increases
- Morocco relaxes its border controls with Ceuta, Spain
- Restrictions on migrants in Turkey tighten following the referendum in April
- Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya fall
- Additional smuggling routes open up
- Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea continue or expand
- NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures
- Rapid deterioration in food security in Nigeria and/or Somalia

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The Government structures have no control of their territory, rather they exert control through armed groups. Fighting between multiple militia coalitions is ongoing in different areas, causing 1.3 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 15/11/2016).

Libya has three governments. The first divide occurred in mid-2014, when the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC) refused to step down for the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR). In January 2016, a UN-backed unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced. Both the HoR and the GNC have spoken out against the GNA, and neither has stepped down. In October 2016, former members of the GNC attempted a coup against the GNA in Tripoli (Reuters 30/03/2016; The Washington Post 20/10/2015).

Libya has significant internal insecurity. The Government structures have no control of their territory, rather they exert control through armed groups. Fighting between multiple militia coalitions is ongoing in different areas, causing 1.3 million people to be in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 15/11/2016).

Political instability in Libya increases, as Libya has three governments. The first divide occurred in mid-2014, when the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC) refused to step down for the newly elected House of Representatives (HoR). In January 2016, a UN-backed unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) was announced. Both the HoR and the GNC have spoken out against the GNA, and neither has stepped down. In October 2016, former members of the GNC attempted a coup against the GNA in Tripoli (Reuters 30/03/2016; The Washington Post 20/10/2015).

Libyan security forces make no significant efforts to curb smuggling operations. Negotiations between Libya and Italy and the EU are ongoing. Implementation is slow and some authorities in both Libya and Italy do not support the deal. The implications of this are unclear. While EUR 90,000 have already been set aside to help Libya stem the flow of migrants, Libya is demanding at least EUR 800,000 (Reuters 17/03/2017; 20/03/2017).

Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan African countries increases. Armed conflict and insecurity are ongoing in Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali and CAR.

Conflicts in countries from Nigeria and/or Somalia increase. In Nigeria 7 million people are estimated to be in Crisis, Emergency, or Famine (Phases 1 – 3) food security conditions between March and May 2017, rising to nearly 8 million between June and August (ReliefWeb 17/05/2017; Humanosphere 18/02/2016).

In Somalia 50% of the population are in need of food assistance: In February 2017, ten times more people (439,000) were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and more than twice as many (2.47 million) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security than six months earlier (FAO 02/2017).
**The scale of humanitarian need in Italy is likely to increase significantly if:**
- Libyan internal insecurity continues or increases
- Political instability in Libya continues or increases
- Libyan security forces make no significant efforts to curb smuggling operations
- Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan African countries increases
- Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya fall
- Additional smuggling routes open up
- Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea continue or expand
- NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures
- Rapid deterioration in food security in Nigeria and/or Somalia

**The scale of humanitarian need in Italy is likely to decrease significantly if:**
- EU/Italy-Libya agreement significantly constrains smuggling operations in Libya
- NATO or Libyan military adopt tougher sea-border control measures
- The EU externalises border control to north African countries
- Political will of EU to accept new arrivals decreases
- Public opinion in Europe becomes increasingly anti-migrant
- Multiple security incidents, attributed by media to immigrants, in EU countries

**The scale of humanitarian need in Italy is likely to remain the same if:**
- Numbers of sub-Saharan migrants entering Libya does not increase significantly
- No significant change to smuggling routes or costs
- The EU-Libya deal has no effect on the security or stability of Libya
- Humanitarian space in Libya remains very limited
- Search and Rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea continue or expand
- NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures

**The scale of humanitarian need in Libya is likely to increase significantly if:**
- EU/Italy-Libya agreement significantly constrains smuggling operations in Libya
- NATO or Libyan military adopt tougher sea-border control measures

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See notes above

Due to ongoing conflict across the country humanitarian access is extremely limited and therefore the extent of needs are unknown.
**ACAPS Scenarios: Refugee/Migrant Crisis in Europe, April 2017**

The EU externalises border control to north African countries;  
Political will of EU to accept new arrivals decreases  
Public opinion in Europe becomes increasingly anti-migrant  
Multiple security incidents, attributed by media to immigrants, in EU countries  
Rapid deterioration in food security in Nigeria and/or Somalia  
Libyan internal insecurity increases  
Political instability in Libya increases  
Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan Africa country increases  
Rapid deterioration in food security in Nigeria and/or Somalia

| The scale of humanitarian need in Libya is likely to remain the same if: |  
| Numbers of sub-Saharan migrants entering Libya does not increase significantly | X  
| No significant change to smuggling routes or costs | X  
| The EU-Libya deal has no effect on the security or stability of Libya | X X  
| Humanitarian space in Libya remains very limited | X  
| NATO or Libyan military do not tighten sea-border control measures | X X  
| Libyan EU/Italy-Libya agreements contribute to improved security in Libya | X  
| Shelter camps established in Libya improving living conditions and safety of migrants | X

| The vulnerability of migrants in the asylum process in the EU is likely to increase significantly if |  
| Libyan internal insecurity continues or increases | X  
| Political instability in Libya continues or increases | X  
| Libyan security forces make no significant efforts to curb smuggling operations | X  
| Conflict in one or more sub-Saharan African countries increases | X  
| Morocco relaxes its border controls with Cueta, Spain | X  
| Smuggling costs from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya fall | X  
| Additional smuggling routes open up | X